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Introduction
There are times when the government takes a position that affects the marketing of a company’s, or even an 
industry’s, products. Many of us are familiar with the sin taxes that are applied to cigarettes and alcohol, and the 
fact that as prices are raised, demand for the products declines (Sadowsky, 2010). Similar results occurred when 
the government determined that pleasure craft such as yachts could stand to be taxed at a higher rate (New York 
Times, 1991). This research will focus on a veiled tax that sought to both reduce the number of federally licensed 
firearms dealers and increase the tax revenue generated from the licensing of those remaining dealers (Maddox). 
Specifically, it will investigate a little known portion of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 
that dramatically increased the license fees for anyone engaged in the business of selling firearms and how that 
change affected the distribution of firearms in the U.S.
The Federal Firearms Act of 1938 imposed the first federal licensing requirement on manufacturers, dealers, and 
importers of firearms. The fee for such a license was $1 per year, payable to the Internal Revenue Service (Carter, 
2006, p.157).  In 1968, the Gun Control Act heightened the importance of the federal firearms license (FFL).  The 
Gun Control Act prohibited the direct mail order of most types of firearms by consumers and restricted interstate 
firearm transactions to purchases facilitated through an FFL holder.1 The Gun Control Act raised the annual 
licensing fee, but kept it to the minimal sum of $10. Due in part to the tighter mail-order restrictions, the number 
of FFLs rose steadily over the next twenty-five years, peaking at almost 245,000 in 1993 (BATF 2013). Many of 
these FFLs were not engaged in the traditional business of selling firearms but were instead so-called “kitchen-
table” dealers—individuals who did not operate a conventional gun or sporting goods store, but instead conduct 
business out of their homes and offices to enjoy lower, wholesale prices and evade some of the red tape associated 
with the laws of buying and selling firearms for themselves or their friends.
In 1993, President Clinton took office with an active agenda to tighten controls on the sale and distribution of 
firearms. Prompted in part by the gun control advocacy group known as the Violence Policy Center and its 1992 
“More Gun Dealers than Gas Stations” study that labeled the “bloated, unmanageable universe of illegitimate 
FFL holders” as a “public safety scandal,” the administration turned its sights on actively limiting the number of 
FFL dealers. President Clinton ordered a review of firearm licensing in the summer of 1993 and, as part of this 
review, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms estimated that 46 percent of FFLs conducted no 
business at all, instead merely using their licenses to buy and sell firearms at wholesale prices across state lines. 
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 was President Clinton’s first major accomplishment in the 
area of gun control. As noted in the final version of the Act, the purpose of the law was “To provide for a waiting 
period before the purchase of a handgun, and for the establishment of a national instant criminal background 
check system to be contacted by firearms dealers before the transfer of any firearm.” A less publicized, last 
minute, addition to the Act was an indirect attempt to limit the number of FFL holders by dramatically increasing 
the cost of obtaining and holding a FFL. Instead of a $10 annual fee, FFL holders now had to pay $200 to obtain 
the license for three years and pay an additional $90 for each 3 year renewal. In addition to the sizeable increase 
in license fees, there was a similar increase in paperwork and red tape necessary to be approved for the license.
Applicants were now required to certify that they had informed the Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the locality 
in which their firearms business would be located of their intent to apply for a result. The application burden 
was heightened again one year later with the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. This 
act required the applicant to include identification photographs and fingerprints as well as to certify that their 
firearms business complied with state laws, zoning laws and zoning regulations.
    
1 18 USC 923(a).
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The predicted result was that FFLs fell drastically to just over 102,000 in March, 2000.
Questions arise as to the effects that this change had on the firearms industry. Did the increase in fees result in 
more revenue for the federal government, as would be the usual desired outcome for a tax increase? Were fewer 
firearms sold in the U.S. as a result of the decline in dealers? Did gun purchasers in some states suffer more than 
in others because of a decline in FFL holders in their home state?
We offer the following hypotheses.
H1:  The increase in fees for the FFL will result in an increase in revenue for the federal government.
Normally, government increases fees or raises taxes with a goal of increasing revenue for itself. Assuming that 
was the case here, it would be predicted that government income would be greater after the fee increase than 
before, even if FFL numbers declined (Sadowsky, 2010). While the number of FFLs issued is expected to decline, 
the larger retailers who sell firearms—Cabela’s, WalMart, BassPro and specialty firearms retailers—as well as 
manufacturers of firearms and ammunition are expected to be sufficiently numerous that the loss of “hobbyist” 
FFL holders will not offset the increased revenue from increasing fees nearly sevenfold.
H2:  The increase in fees would result in fewer FFL holders.
Basic economic theory suggests that as the cost of acquiring a good increases, demand will decline. Therefore we 
predict that and increase in fees from $10 per year to $200 for three years would result in a significant decrease 
in demand.
H3:  A decline in dealer numbers will result in an increase in sales volume for remaining dealers and a reduction 
in consumer choice.
Because firearms can generally be purchased only within one’s home state, a decrease in the number of available 
purchase outlets—assuming no change in demand for goods sold—will inhibit the choice options of buyers. 
Those purchasers in isolated areas far from dealers cannot use mail order to purchase firearms, and so may forego 
the purchase or will be forced to travel greater distances to acquire their purchase. The remaining dealers have 
the opportunity to expand their inventory as their smaller competitors disappear.
H4:  A decline in dealers is positively correlated with a decline in overall production and sale of new firearms.
When there are fewer dealers from whom to buy firearms, purchasers will seek other means of acquiring their 
goods (Sirico, 2001). In the case of firearms, they may still buy from unlicensed individuals in private transactions. 
This would result in fewer new firearms being sold, thereby decreasing demand and output from manufacturers. 
A similar result occurred when a luxury tax was placed on yachts, causing a decline in new yacht sales (New 
York Times, 1991).
Data Analysis
Data on the number of FFLs issued, firearms sold and fees charged were obtained from the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives reports from 2001 and 2014. These data were analyzed with regard to the 
hypotheses stated above.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that revenue for the federal government would increase, even though the number of FFL 
holders declined. Although not precise because of overlaps in the new 3 year license fees, the revenue generated 
from FFLs was calculated as the number of FFL holders multiplied by the fee structure in place during that year. 
Because FFL fees for 1994 were for a 3 year rather than a single year license, the annual fee was rounded to 
$66.67 (i.e. $200 divided by 3, with errors or rounding). Fees paid per FFL in 1993 were $10 per license.  
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It is readily apparent from Table 1 that in the first year when the new fee structure was implemented, revenues 
went up dramatically—this is not surprising, as the fees increased twentyfold and the three year fee was paid 
at once. However, that income stream steadily declined as FFL numbers diminished, with a large drop-off of 
nearly 89,000 (36%) FFLs between 1993 and 1995.  By 2007, income from FFLs stabilizes at the low $3 million 
per year range and FFLs stabilize between 47,000 and 52,000. Hence H1 is supported. Actual total revenue 
from 1993 to 2012 was $96.2 million. Revenue if FFL numbers had remained constant and no fee increase was 
instituted would have been $49.4 million. Thus, government action from the standpoint of merely increasing 
revenue was sound.
Table 1
 Estimated FFL Fee Revenue from 1993 to 2012
1 2 3 4 5
Year Average fee 




Revenue ($) Revenue ($) from 
FFLs assuming no 
change from 1993
1993 10  246,984 2,469,840 2,469,840
1994 66.67  213,734 14,249,646 2,469,840
1995 66.67  158,240 10,549,861 2,469,840
1996 66.67  105,398 7,026,885 2,469,840
1997 66.67 79,285 5,285,931 2,469,840
1998 66.67 75,619 5,041,519 2,469,840
1999 66.67 71,290 4,752,904 2,469,840
2000 66.67 67,476 4,498,625 2,469,840
2001 66.67 63,845 4,256,546 2,469,840
2002 66.67 59,829 3,988,799 2,469,840
2003 66.67 57,492 3,832,992 2,469,840
2004 66.67 56,103 3,740,387 2,469,840
2005 66.67 53,833 3,589,046 2,469,840
2006 66.67 51,462 3,430,972 2,469,840
2007 66.67 49,221 3,281,564 2,469,840
2008 66.67 48,261 3,217,561 2,469,840
2009 66.67 47,509 3,167,425 2,469,840
2010 66.67 47,664 3,177,759 2,469,840
2011 66.67 48,676 3,245,229 2,469,840
2012 66.67 50,848 3,390,036 2,469,840
Sources: “Firearms Commerce in the United States:  Annual Statistical Update 2014”, and “Firearms Commerce in the United States: 
Annual Statistical Update 2011.
Column 2:  FFL fees of $200 from 1994 onward are spread over 3 years, so revenue per year for outstanding FFLs is averaged at $66.67 
per year per FFL.
Hypothesis 2 is also supported. It predicted that increasing fees would result in fewer FFL dealers. Table 2 shows 
the decline was slight for 1994, as licenses are issued on a 12 month basis, not annually beginning on January 
1. However, in 1995, the rout began and FFL numbers declined. From a peak of nearly 247,000 in 1993, license 
holders reached a nadir of 47,500 in 2009 and rebounded to 51,000 in 2012.
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Firearms are an unusual consumer purchase as there are significant restrictions that inhibit a person’s ability to 
purchase firearms from a source outside of that person’s home state. Rules vary based upon the type of firearm. 
In general handgun purchases face tighter restrictions than long gun purchases. For example, handgun purchases 
across state lines must be done through a federal firearms license holder, which necessarily involves extra fees 
paid to the FFL dealer who receives the firearm and to the receiving agent. Long gun sales are not subject to the 
same federal restriction, but varying state regulations complicate most transactions.  
Data regarding Hypothesis 3 can be found in Tables 2 and 3. H3 suggests that consumer choice will be inhibited 
as the number of dealers declines and that sales per dealer will increase.
Table 2 shows the number of FFLs issued to dealers in the U.S. from 1993 (the last year of inexpensive licenses) 
to 2012 compared to the number of firearms manufactured in those years.
Table 2
Firearms Production and FFLs




1993 246,984       5,055,637 20
1994 213,734       5,173,217 24
1995 158,240       4,316,342 27
1996 105,398       3,854,439 37
1997 79,285       3,593,504 45
1998 75,619       3,713,590 49
1999 71,290       4,047,747 57
2000 67,476       3,793,541 56
2001 63,845       2,932,655 46
2002 59,829       3,366,895 56
2003 57,492       3,308,404 58
2004 56,103       3,099,025 55
2005 53,833       3,241,494 60
2006 51,462       3,653,324 71
2007 49,221       3,922,613 80
2008 48,261       4,498,944 93
2009 47,509       5,555,818 117
2010 47,664       5,459,240 115
2011 48,676       6,541,886 134
2012 50,848       8,578,610 169
Source:  “Firearms Commerce in the United States:  Annual Statistical Update 2014.
As seen in Table 2, the number of arms produced increased over 75% during the period shown, while dealer 
numbers dropped nearly 80%. The concentration of power and merchandise among the remaining FFL holders 
is readily apparent. In the aggregate, consumer choice of from whom they purchase firearms is demonstrably 
reduced.
A further question involved how the reduction in dealers affected consumer choice in individual states. Data for 
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the number of FFLs per state were more difficult to locate, but information is found in Table 3 for comparison 
years of 2001 and 2013. In 2001, the overall number of FFLs issued to dealers dropped below 64,000, a precipitous 
decline from almost 247,000 in 1993. Interestingly, the number of dealers per 1000 population rose from 2001 to 
2013 in 40 states. The average increase per state in the number of FFL dealers over the period was 38%.  Some 
states saw dramatic decreases in gun dealers, presumably reducing consumer choice. Alaska, Massachusetts, 
Montana and New Jersey all saw significant decreases. In the case of New Jersey and Massachusetts, these 
declines are more likely the result of onerous state laws restricting firearms ownership in general. Inexplicably, 
states such as Maine, Maryland and Rhode Island saw over 100% increases in the number of FFL holders in the 
state. When considering the percent change of FFLs per 1000 population in each state, 28 states showed less 
than 10% change, either positive or negative. Montana lost almost half of its FFLs and Alaska experienced a 
significant decline, but both states had relatively low populations. Hence, Table 2 demonstrates that dealer sales 
volumes increased, showing partial support for H3. However, there is inconclusive evidence from individual 
states indicating that consumer choice was constrained. Overall, Hypothesis 3 is not supported.
The final hypothesis, that a decline in dealers would be positively correlated with a reduction in firearms sales, 
was partially supported. Table 4 shows the guns sold per year and the corresponding U.S. population. Dealer 
numbers dropped precipitously from 1994 to 1996 and then were halved again between 1996 and 2003. Gun sales 
per million population fell by almost 50% during the same time period, as predicted. Firearms sales spiked in 
years when restrictive legislation was considered—1993-94 during the Clinton administration (1993-2000) and 
especially during the Obama administration (2009 and 2012), contrary to the prediction of reduced sales with 
fewer dealers. The buying public likely anticipated more draconian ownership restrictions and sought to acquire 
firearms in advance of a predicted ban. Reports from firearms organizations indicate that Presidents Clinton 
and Obama were very good for business, as firearms sales peaked soon after the elections of each of these men 
(Beckett 2016; Devaney 2015; Gregory 2009).  
Table 3
FFL holders by state
State 2001 FFLs 
(dealers per 1000 
pop.)
2013 FFLs 
(dealers per 1000 
pop.)
% change in dealers 
per 1000 pop.
Alabama 1911 (0.428) 2404 (0.498) 7.0
Alaska 1237 (1.952) 1011 (1.371) -58.1
Arizona 1900 (0.360) 3062 (0.462) 10.1
Arkansas 1504 (0.559) 2009 (0.679) 12.0
California 6093 (0.177) 8465 (.220) 4.4
Colorado 1879 (.425) 2829 (.537) 11.2
Connecticut 1222 (.356) 1808 (.503) 14.7
Delaware 197 (.248) 345 (.373) 12.5
Florida 4438 (.271) 7494 (.383) 11.1
Georgia 2962 (.354) 3807 (.381) 2.7
Hawaii 203 (.166) 308  (.218) 5.3
Idaho 1148 (.870) 1403 (.870) 0.0
Illinois 3547 (.284) 5077 (.394) 11.0
Indiana 2544 (.415) 2961 (.451) 3.5
Iowa 1685 (.575) 2158 (.698) 12.3
Kansas 1486 (.550) 1939 (.670) 12.0
Kentucky 1931 (.475) 2473 (.562) 8.8
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Louisiana 1827 (.408) 2157 (.466) 5.8
Maine 767 (.596) 3826 (2.879) 228.2
Maryland 1482 (.276) 3175 (.535) 25.9
Massachusetts 2002 (.313) 974 (.145) -16.8
Michigan 4323 (.433) 4366 (.441) 0.8
Minnesota 2590 (.520) 2722 (.502) -1.8
Mississippi 1540 (.540) 1504 (.503) -3.7
Missouri 3781 (.670) 5934 (.982) 31.2
Montana 2997 (3.304) 1524 (1.503) -180.1
Nebraska 1020 (.593) 1138 (.609) 1.6
Nevada 847  (.404) 1361 (.488) 8.4
New Hampshire 740 (.589) 1176 (.889) 30.0
New Jersey 631 (.074) 545 (.061) -1.3
New Mexico 983 (.537) 1150 (.551) 1.4
New York 3687 (.193) 4130 (.210) 1.7
North Carolina 2997 (.365) 4728 (.480) 11.5
North Dakota 653 (1.022) 638 (.882) -14.0
Ohio 3987 (.350) 5014 (.433) 8.3
Oklahoma 1936 (.558) 2461 (.639) 8.0
Oregon 2232 (.644) 2608 (.664) 2.0
Pennsylvania 4867 (.396) 6227 (.487) 9.2
Rhode Island 296 (.280) 602 (.572) 29.2
South Carolina 1226 (.302) 2209 (.463) 16.2
South Dakota 647 (.854) 798 (.944) 9.0
Tennessee 2401 (.417) 3516 (.541) 12.4
Texas 7535 (.353) 10,532 (.397) 4.4
Utah 862 (.377) 1241 (.427) 5.0
Vermont 575 (.939) 558 (.890) -4.9
Virginia 2878 (.400) 4441 (.537) 13.7
Washington 2013 (.336) 2871 (.412) 7.5
West Virginia 1379 (.766) 1469 (.784) 1.9
Wisconsin 2466 (.456) 3130 (.545) 8.9
Wyoming 774 (1.565) 871 (1.494) -7.1
Table 4
Firearms Sales and FFLs vs. US Population




Guns sold per 
million population
1993 260.0 950  19,445 
1994 263.1 812  19,663 
1995 266.3 594  16,209 
1996 269.4 391  14,307 
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1997 272.6 291  13,182 
1998 275.8 274  13,465 
1999 279.0 256  14,508 
2000 282.2 239  13,443 
2001 285.0 224  10,290 
2002 287.6 208  11,707 
2003 290.1 198  11,404 
2004 292.8 192  10,584 
2005 295.5 182  10,970 
2006 298.4 172  12,243 
2007 301.2 163  13,023 
2008 304.1 159  14,794 
2009 306.8 155  18,109 
2010 308.1 155  17,719 
2011 310.4 157  21,076 
2012 312.8 163  27,425 
Conclusions
The government ultimately has the authority to regulate commerce and has the right to control sale of firearms 
through a dealer network. The goals of the government through the fee increase were to reduce the number of 
FFLs issued, increase revenue from license fees and cut down on firearms sales. The first outcome of the first 
goal was quite successful, with FFL issuances dropping to 20% of their 1993 levels. In addition, the government 
was also able to increase its revenues from the sale of FFLs, with fees going from $2.47 million in 1993 to $3.4 
million in 2012. Despite the precipitous drop in the number of  licenses issued, the increase in fees was more than 
sufficient to offset the decline in numbers.
Firearms sales did decline from 1994 to 2005. However, sales moved up to 1994 levels in 2010 and surged in 
2011-12 (see Figure 1). Were gun buyers negatively affected in terms of their ease of locating dealers?  The 
answer to that question is still open. Fewer dealers meant that sales were concentrated in the hands of fewer sales 
outlets, making it more of a challenge for consumers located away from larger towns to acquire firearms. The 
degree to which that outcome was significant is still an open question that requires further study.
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Relevance to Marketing Educators, Researchers and Practitioners: Limiting the number of suppliers by 
raising the entry barrier should have an effect on consumers’ access to product. In this instance, that assumption 
did not hold. Also, government intervention to restrict consumer access to product is not always successful.
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